As US disengagement puts global institutions to the test, what’s sustaining them and what’s at stake?

A researcher at LMU’s Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science, Dr. Tim Heinkelmann-Wild studies the consequences of US withdrawal from the rules-based multilateral order and shows how international agreements and organizations can remain viable without the support of the global hegemon.

His dissertation on this subject – After Exit: Alternative Leadership and Institutional Resilience after Hegemonic Withdrawal – has already garnered for its author the John McCain Dissertation Award of the Munich Security Conference, a Munich University Society (MUG) doctoral award, and the Dissertation Award of the United Nations Association of Germany (DGVN). Now, the LMU researcher is receiving the German Thesis Award this coming Thursday.

Dr. Heinkelmann-Wild, nearly a year into Donald Trump’s second presidency, and one year after our first interview, how would you assess the situation of the multilateral world order today?

Tim Heinkelmann-Wild: In a few months, Trump has done what he took four years to do during his first term. And he has gone even further.

The United States has again withdrawn from the World Health Organization (WHO), the Paris Climate Agreement, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and other multilateral forums. At the same time, it has slashed its overseas aid and development budgets by around 90 percent. In international trade, the Trump administration continues to obstruct the World Trade Organization (WTO) while pursuing a tough tariff policy. Through extensive bilateral “deals,” the US is effectively constructing its own parallel trade regime alongside the existing global trade order.

Given Trump’s first term, shouldn’t we have anticipated this withdrawal?

From a political science standpoint, certainly. However, few observers expected Trump to win again. As a result, the reactions of international organizations and European governments after the 2024 election were rather hectic. The exceptions tended to be organizations that had already experienced US withdrawal on repeated occasions. And these organizations are indeed better positioned now than during Trump’s first term.

Could you give an example?

If we look at UNESCO, we see that the United States used to contribute over 20 percent of its budget. When Washington rejoined under Joe Biden, this dependence was reduced to around eight percent. Consequently, the withdrawal of US membership is considerably less painful this time. UNESCO has adapted to living without the United States.

How is Europe responding to this renewed US disengagement?

The reaction of the EU and European governments to date is much more circumspect than during Trump’s first term. While the rhetoric on multilateral institutions is often very positive, practical measures have lagged behind what they were during Trump’s first presidency. This is disastrous, as when a major player like the United States drops out, other powerful states must step up and at least partially fill the gap. While Europe demonstrated such willingness during Trump mark one, that resolve appears to have diminished.

What explains this shift?

Three developments can explain why Europe’s response to Trump is weaker this time around: the rise of right-wing populism, the pandemic, and the threat posed by Russia. First of all, the increasing strength of nationalist and authoritarian forces has not been limited to the MAGA movement in the United States. With the support of Trump and his supporters as one of the drivers, the influence of right-wing populists in Europe has increased. These groups are opposed to strong multilateral institutions – including the EU. Secondly, the acceptance of multilateral institutions came under added strain during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Criticism of the WHO and its recommendations fueled fundamental skepticism among parts of the population with regard to the authority of international organizations as apolitical experts and neutral sources of information. At the same time, the pandemic dampened Europe’s economic output. And finally, Russia’s war against Ukraine has caused more of available resources to be spent on defense. Given the threat from Russia, moreover, Europe is afraid to provoke the United States, the main guarantor of its security, by advocating for multilateral institutions.

Why the future of Europe depends on multilateralism

What options are there for bolstering multilateralism?

It’s within the power of European policymakers to revive multilateralism, even under current auspices. After all, the financial resources required to sustain multilateral institutions are modest compared with those allocated to defense. Supporting multilateralism need not come at the expense of our security.

Moreover, maintaining a rules-based order is very much in Europe’s strategic interest. Neither Germany nor the EU is going to become a great military power on a par with Russia, China, and the United States in the foreseeable future. In a power-based system, Europe would be at a disadvantage. Europe should therefore do its utmost to sustain rules-based cooperation wherever possible. In this game, Europe can fully leverage its economic power and particularly its soft power as a credible advocate of multilateralism.

I hope this understanding gains traction in European capitals and in Brussels, and that the political will to defend multilateralism returns.

What prospects do you see for multilateralism globally?

The global prospects remain strong for multilateralism. In the Global South, there are still many staunch supporters of a rules-based and inclusive system. It is emphatically not in the interest of smaller and emerging countries for the law of the strongest to override international law.

Europe can cooperate with these states and forge strong partnerships in various policy areas: with Latin America on human rights, say, or with China, or indeed now Brazil, on climate issues. But doing so requires Europe to take these partners seriously and pursue compromise rather than narrow self-interest. This would mark an important pragmatic shift in Europe’s current posture.

Where are international organizations most vulnerable to unilateral action by member states?

Multilateral institutions are strongly dependent on the political support and contributions of their members. They tend to get into trouble when their resources come from just a few states – historically often the US – who then withdraw their funding. We see this currently in the UN’s budget crisis. In addition, veto powers – such as those in the WTO or the UN Security Council – allow individual states to obstruct entire organizations and thus render them ineffective.

A new trend, and a most concerning one, is the United States, often in conjunction with Argentina, requesting recorded votes on previously consensual UN resolutions on subjects like sustainability, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights. This is an attempt to erode the shared values that have been established over decades. It not only undermines the political foundations of the UN, but also jeopardizes European unity. If some right-wing nationalist governments can deviate from the majority position, the EU can no longer speak with one voice.

Why the U.S. continues to withdraw from the world order

If a Democratic administration was to succeed Trump, what is the likelihood of many of these decisions and withdrawals being reversed?

A full change of course is unlikely – even under Democratic leadership. After Trump’s first term, Joe Biden reversed some of his predecessor’s foreign policy, but continued with other elements. This is because of three long-term trends, which are driving the US withdrawal from the rules-based multilateral order regardless of which party is in power.

Firstly, global power is shifting toward the Global South, particularly China. This is prompting the United States to reallocate resources from multilateral institutions and development aid toward Indo-Pacific security priorities.

Secondly, multilateral institutions have gained significant influence since the end of the Cold War, and the United States is forced to share its power there with increasingly powerful member states from the Global South. Policymakers from both major parties therefore often view such institutions less as tools for pursuing the national interest than as obstacles.

Thirdly, there is a shift underway in US domestic politics, with younger generations from both parties turning away from traditional internationalism. They view foreign interventions and multilateral institutions with skepticism and are more focused on domestic issues.

These trends suggest that the US will likely continue its disengagement from multilateral cooperation. Even moderate administrations will only partially slow this momentum, but will not fundamentally reverse course.

Looking ahead, is there anything that gives you hope?

After Trump’s address at the United Nations, the majority of states were very robust in their defense of multilateralism. Equally, Europe has not departed from these multilateral principles thus far, at least in its rhetoric.

What’s crucial now is proactive engagement on the part of Europe. It should not attempt to simply wait out Trump’s presidency, but should seize the moment to collaborate with like-minded states to preserve and adapt the rules-based order to these new times. The current UN reform process presents an opportunity here. Trump’s first term showed that Europe is capable of leading the way in standing up for multilateralism. Whether it will repeat this success depends on political will.